

**China's Challenge and Asia's Rise:
The Case for U.S. Strategic Reengagement in the Asia-
Pacific Region**
Prepared Statement of Dr. Kurt Campbell



May 15, 2008

U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee

Chairman Biden, Ranking Member Lugar, distinguished members of the Committee, it is an honor to appear before you today to discuss the strategic challenges confronting the United States over the course of the next decade and beyond in the Asia-Pacific.

A trip through Asia, even a relatively brief one, reveals some disquieting concerns over the current American position in the region. In these waning months of the Bush Administration, with the country bogged down and preoccupied in Iraq, the United States faces an unpalatable choice posed by the “Siberian dilemma” in Iraq. Just what is the Siberian dilemma and how does it apply to the unforgiving urban battlefields of Iraq? And more to the point, what does this have to do with Asia?

The fishermen of northernmost Russia go out onto the frozen lakes of Siberia in temperatures approaching 60 degrees below zero centigrade to fill their catch. They know from experience that the biggest fish congregate at the center of lakes where the ice is the thinnest. They slowly make their way out across the ice listening carefully for the telltale signs of cracking. If a fisherman is unlucky enough to fall through the ice into the freezing water, he is confronted immediately with what is known as the Siberian dilemma. If he pulls himself out of the water onto the ice, his body will freeze immediately in the atmosphere and the fisherman will die of shock. If, however, he chooses to take his chances in the water, the fisherman will inevitably perish of hypothermia. Such is the stark choice presented by the Siberian dilemma.

With sand instead of ice, President Bush faces a kind of Siberian dilemma of his own making when it comes to his political and diplomatic efforts with regard to Iraq. We are now entering the most consequential phase of the unpopular war, and America’s power and prestige (as well as President Bush’s legacy) hang in the balance.

Some of the President’s closest advisers have told him to spend all his waking hours on selling an increasingly skeptical American populace on the necessity of continuing with the war – a war that many expect to end badly despite all the effort, attention and sacrifices of those engaged in the conflict. Another set of advisers argue that the United States must begin to put Iraq in context and focus on other issues of importance, such as the drama playing out in Asia and in particular China’s dramatic ascent. If we don’t begin to engage more seriously on other critical global issues — these policy wonks claim — the United States risks not only a major setback not only in Iraq but on other consequential global playing fields spanning Asia, Africa, Latin America and even Europe. However, through this course of action, the

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United States risks inadvertently sending the message that it is giving up on Iraq at a critical juncture.

This set of very bad choices approximates a Siberian dilemma for America. To date, the administration has chosen fundamentally to stay in the sands of Iraq – and basically hope for the best elsewhere. This choice is highlighted by a lack of strategic clarity and engagement in Asia. For instance, it was commendable that the president managed to make it to the APEC leaders summit in Australia (after a detour to Iraq), but unfortunately he chose to depart a day before the meeting concluded and skipped the preceding ASEAN summit for heads of state. On the last day of the APEC summit, the chair reserved for the President of the United States was conspicuously empty as the powers of the Asia Pacific – China, India, Japan and others — looked on. This is precisely where China has been most apt at filling America's void in the region—by engaging in constant high-level meetings and shaping regional agendas.

This absence is compounded by the nonattendance in recent years of United States officials, including the Secretary of State, at numerous other region-wide sessions like the ASEAN Regional Forum and the most recent round of the Australia-U.S. Ministerial Consultations. It used to be that the United States needed strong bilateral relationships before venturing into the territory of multilateral forums. Increasingly, however, the reverse is true. Active participation in the new multilateral structures of Asia is necessary and important for effective management of bilateral ties and impending security challenges in the region.

While the Bush team has made significant progress in broadening and strengthening our bilateral alliances with Australia, Japan, and South Korea and tried gamely to develop strategic collaboration with India, the usefulness of these efforts has been challenged by a growing perception in Asia that America just does not understand the significance of China's rise and Asia's ascent.

The epicenter of global power is no longer the Atlantic but the Pacific. China's ascent has arguably been one of the most rapid and consequential in history, in many ways rivaling or even surpassing the significance of America's rise in stature during the first two decades of the last century. Rarely in history has a rising power gained such prominence in the international system at least partially because of the actions of – and at the expense of – the dominant power, in this case the United States. The arrival of the Pacific century has hastened challenges to American influence and power in the greater Asia-Pacific.

From India to Australia, Asia, more than any other part of the globe, is defined by opportunity: democracy continues to spread beyond the traditional outposts of Japan and South Korea; the continent now accounts for almost 30 percent of global GDP; and the world's most wired and upwardly mobile populations are Asian. Asian visitors to the U.S. now often complain about the poor quality of American wired networks when compared with the dramatic innovations of on-line and mobile communication in Asia.

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Home to more than half the world's population, Asia is the manufacturing and information technology "engine of the world." Asians are shaping a world that is ever more integrated. New regional forums like the East Asia Summit and the Boao Forum for Asia (an Asian Davos of sorts that brings together the political and economic elites of the region) are reshaping cooperation and fostering deeper ties. For instance, this year's Boao Forum enabled high level contact between Taiwan's Vice President Vincent Siew and Chinese Premier Hu Jintao. Free trade agreements are rapidly integrating Asian economies. Amidst this integration, 21st century Asia is rich with innovation. The latest gadgets and most dynamic internet communities exist in Asia, where customers expect cell phones to stream video and conduct financial transactions. Asia is also investing like never before. Asian countries lead the world with unprecedented infrastructure projects. With over \$3 trillion in foreign currency reserves, Asian nations and business are starting to shape global economic activity. Indian firms are purchasing industrial giants like Arcelor Steel, as well as iconic brands of its once colonial ruler like Jaguar and Range Rover. China, along with other Asian financial players, injected billions in capital to help steady American investment banks like Merrill Lynch as the subprime mortgage collapse unfolded. All the while, these nations are developing and industrializing at unprecedented rates. Asia now accounts for over 40 percent of global consumption of steel and China is leading the pack by consuming almost half of global concrete.

Yet Asia is not a theater of peace: between 15 and 50 people die every day from causes tied to conflict, and suspicions rooted in rivalry and nationalism run deep. The continent exhibits every traditional and non-traditional challenge of our age: a cauldron of religious and ethnic tension; a source of terror and extremism; the driver of our insatiable appetite for energy; the place where the most people will suffer the adverse effects of global climate change; the primary source of nuclear proliferation; and the most likely arena for nuclear conflict. Importantly, resolution and management of these challenges will prove increasingly difficult – if not impossible – without strong U.S.-Chinese cooperation.

However, even Beijing remains uncertain about how best to manage the still-powerful independence movement in Taiwan. The issue presents an acute dilemma for China's leaders, whose individual and collective legitimacy could be undermined either by the "loss" of Taiwan or by the problems that would ensue from a military conflict over the island. Chinese authorities perceive a realization of its fears in U.S. efforts to promote a cooperative network of regional ballistic missile defense programs, which Beijing fears could lead to a de-facto U.S.-Australia-Japan-ROK-Taiwan collective defense alliance. This is a strategic competition that the United States can only engage in effectively with an appropriate balance of renewing our soft-power efforts and rebalancing our military commitments to reassure our friends and allies and dissuade potential adversaries from taking provocative actions

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Soft Power and Trade

In order for Chinese leaders to meet their goal of great power status, Beijing has embarked upon a global effort to expand its influence and credibility. China is attempting to cultivate its image and attractiveness – perhaps to counter America’s monopoly on soft power –for example, by building over 100 Confucius Learning centers from South Korea to Kenya to Argentina. China is also buying other powers’ allegiance away from Taiwan; building road, rail and energy infrastructure through Central Asia; and securing exclusive rights to energy throughout Africa and South America--most observers agree that this pattern shows a loss of U.S. influence in the region to China.

Even though China has always had a popular cultural following, that following is now achieving a global scale. For example, China received its first Nobel Prize in Literature – awarded to the controversial poet laureate, Gao Xingjian – in 2000; foreign students studying in Chinese universities trebled from 36,000 to over 110,000 over the past decade; and the rise to stardom of China’s basketball super-star Yao Ming has resulted in China acquiring a sobriquet as basketball’s “final frontier.” Beijing is systematically and sophisticatedly increasing global knowledge about Chinese culture, philosophy and language. These examples have become a central part of China’s soft power playbook and will be boosted by its hosting of the 2008 Summer Olympic Games.

Many of China’s gains in the Asia-Pacific are natural. After all, China is culturally, geographically and historically the giant of the region. From Africa to South America, China is establishing strong bilateral relationships and funding development and economic assistance programs. China’s “no strings attached” foreign assistance policy – referred to as the Beijing consensus– is attractive to many developing nations. These nations view China’s historical struggle with poverty and industrialization as both inspirational and an alternative model to the more cumbersome Western approach to development with its emphasis on democracy and market liberalization.

Nowhere is China’s presence more noticeable than in Southeast Asia, where the United States is often notably absent. Even though China’s trade with ASEAN countries is less still than the U.S.-ASEAN trade relationship, prospects for China overtaking the U.S. are becoming more likely with the ASEAN-China Free Trade Agreement. In 2000, two-way ASEAN-U.S. trade totaled over \$121 billion; the U.S. accounted for over 16 percent of ASEAN’s total trade, the largest single-partner component. That same year, \$32 billion in trade with China only accounted for 4.3 percent of the region’s total. By 2005, the most recent year for which ASEAN has published statistics, trade with the U.S. rose to nearly \$154 billion, a proportion equal to that of the other top partner, Japan, at 12.6 percent. Meanwhile, in those same five years, China more than tripled its trade with the region, to \$113 billion, a number that now represents 9.3 percent of ASEAN’s total. (The E.U. runs a close third, ahead of China, in 2005: \$140.5

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billion and 11.5 percent). To illustrate that this is indeed a long-term trend, it should be noted that while China's trade with ASEAN increased more than 13-fold between 1993 and 2005, America's doubled: \$8.9 billion to \$113 billion and \$75.7 billion to \$153 billion, respectively. At that rate of change, and absent unforeseen limits on China's capacity, parity between the U.S., Japan, the E.U., and China is imminent, and China's assumption of the crown all but preordained.

There are many success stories of China's effective public diplomacy through Southeast Asia. Perhaps most illustrative is Beijing's decision to foot the bill for the reconstruction of Dili, East Timor's war-ravaged capital that was all but leveled by intense fighting between East Timorese and the Indonesian military. East Timor is both a natural resource-rich state and an ideal staging ground for China's intensive public diplomacy campaign, one that showcases its benevolent foreign policy. China sees East Timor as a strategic investment in its expanding sphere of influence, and a potential source of rights to untapped natural resources. PetroChina got the contract rights to conduct seismic tests to determine the volume of oil and natural gas in the Timor Gap, potentially valued at \$30 billion USD. Australian troops and U.S. and United Nations diplomats may have guaranteed Timorese freedom, but China provided the inhabitants of the new Presidential palace and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs building with resort-like offices.

All the while, China has been strategically securing mountains of American debt and treasury bills (T-bills). Recent reports indicate that China now owns over \$388 billion USD in T-bills, almost 20 percent of the global total. China's financial stakes in the U.S. economy are disconcerting to many, but a major Chinese sell-off of T-bills seems unlikely because of the negative consequences it would impose on China's economy and its image as a rational actor. Furthermore, not only do Chinese exports provide affordable products to the American consumer, their possession of foreign exchange reserves – estimated at \$1.6 trillion in March 2008– helps spur domestic economic growth in the U.S. and fund the U.S. federal budget deficit. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are costing the American taxpayers hundreds of billions each year, and China continues to fund those war expenditures. Such dependency on Beijing is a double-edged sword that requires strategic reflection and possible adjustments to economic strategy.

Even though China has made miraculous gains in the region over the last two decades, there are problems on the horizon that could challenge its ascent and image. Most pressingly, Beijing needs to responsibly manage tensions and violence in Tibet if it wants to ease concerns around the region. The international community continues to challenge Chinese officials to think of the long-term implications of its heavy-handed approach to dissent and free expression. In the months leading up to the Beijing Olympics nations will continue to pressure China on the Tibet issue, but these countries must also understand that if they continue to constantly needle China, the chances for a miscalculated decision with disproportionate consequences remains a major concern.

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Military Modernization:

Recent news reports of China building an undersea submarine base seem right out of a James Bond movie. China has been mysteriously building and modernizing its military forces – presumably to respond to a contingency in the Cross-Straits, though regional powers such as India and Japan believe otherwise. Anxiety in the region is growing as China continues to invest billions advancing in its force projection capabilities.

According to the Department of Defense's annual report on China's military, "On March 4, 2007, Beijing announced a 17.8 percent increase in its military budget... a 19.47 percent increase from 2006." This figure continues an average annual increase of 15 percent during the past five years in China's military spending, one of the few sectors that outpaces the country's economic growth. Since the late 1990s, the Chinese government has accelerated efforts to modernize and upgrade the People's Liberation Army (PLA). The lack of transparency regarding Chinese defense expenditures obscures matters, but most foreign analysts estimate that the PRC spent between \$97 billion and \$139 billion on military-related spending in 2007 (up to three times the official Chinese budget figures of \$45 billion, which excludes spending on military research and development, nuclear weapons, and major foreign-weapons imports). Despite China's significant military modernization, they have yet to publically articulate a "grand strategy" and continue to pursue non-confrontational policies as laid out in Deng's "24 Character Strategy."

Whatever the true number, U.S.-led military operations in Iraq and the former Yugoslavia clearly have inspired the Chinese government to pursue improved capacities for power projection, precision strikes, and the other attributes associated with the latest so-called revolution in military affairs (RMA). For example, the PLA has emphasized developing rapid reaction forces capable of deploying beyond China's borders, and the PLA navy (PLA-N) has been acquiring longer-range offensive and defense missile systems and a more effective submarine force (which is stealthier and more operationally efficient). Chinese strategists have also sought to develop an "assassin's mace" collection of niche weapons that the PLA can use to exploit asymmetrical vulnerabilities in adversary military defenses, such as America's growing dependence on complex information technology.

Besides allowing the PRC to improve its traditionally weak indigenous defense industry, rapid economic growth has made China a prolific arms importer. Russia has been an especially eager seller. Recently acquired Russian weapons systems include advanced military aircraft (e.g., Su-27s and Su-30s) and naval systems such as Sovremenny-class missile destroyers equipped with SS-N-22 Sunburn anti-ship missiles, and improved Kilo-class diesel class attack submarines that would enhance a Chinese military campaign against Taiwan. According to a recent IISS report, China's Navy "has evolved from a purely coastal-

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defense force into one with growing oceanic capabilities. This has enabled it to change the way it views itself, its future trajectory and its role in Chinese national security.” The PLA-N force includes 74 principal combatants, 57 attack submarines, 55 medium and heavy amphibious ships, and 49 coastal missile patrol craft. In addition, recent reports suggest that China is planning to develop a three-carrier battle group posture – a project that the PRC could start by decade’s end. Moreover, PLA-N is advancing its “over the horizon” targeting capabilities with new radars, and developing a new SSBN (Jin-class) which may soon enter service.

China is also devoting more resources to manufacturing and deploying advanced indigenous weapons systems. The PLA has now fielded the indigenously produced DF-31 and DF-31A intercontinental ballistic missiles, which are especially important because their mobility makes them hard to destroy. China’s air force modernization programs continue. China’s indigenous J-10 system is now being followed-up with a supposed fifth generation multi-role J-12. These platforms will complement the existing 490 combat aircraft “within unrefueled operational range of Taiwan,” as well as the modernization of the FB-7A fighter-bomber. China’s space program has resulted in its acquiring new surveillance, communication, and navigation capabilities critical to coordinating military operations against Taiwan or other contingencies beyond Chinese territory. China’s successful attempt to destroy an aging weather satellite in January 2007, followed by the launch of a lunar module in fall 2007, demonstrated a significant jump in China’s anti-space assets.

Although China’s military buildup appears to be primarily motivated by a potential Taiwan contingency, many of its recent acquisitions could facilitate the projection of military power into more distant threats of great importance to the United States, including Japan, India, Southeast Asia, and Australia. Some of the missile, air, and increasingly mobile ground forces directed at Taiwan could be deployed to multiple points on China’s periphery. The soon-to-be-fielded conventional land-attack cruise missiles, which could be deployed on China’s new Type 093 nuclear-powered submarines, will give China a limited but useful global power-projection capability. In addition, Russia is now marketing Tu-22 Backfire and Tu-95 Bear bombers to the PLA, which could enable it to conduct air strikes against distant targets in Southeast Asia and elsewhere. Many PLA navy commanders still desire the acquisition of an aircraft carrier fleet, a traditional symbol both of global power-projection capabilities and great-power status. The Chinese presence in Gwadar, Pakistan, located opposite the vital energy corridors of the Straits of Hormuz, also has a strategic dimension. For several years, China has been pursuing a “string of pearls” strategy to gain access to major ports from the Persian Gulf to Bangladesh, Cambodia, and the South China Sea. China’s neighbors are wary. A career Japanese diplomat recently wrote, “If China’s military expansion remains nontransparent and continues at its current pace, states with interests in East Asia will, at some point, begin to perceive China as a security threat. Institutionalized trilateral security dialogue among Japan, the United States and China would be one way to minimize such threat perceptions.” American involvement

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is key to such efforts to build trust and reduce tension.

None of these developments is surprising; great powers expect to have strong militaries, and the United States certainly appreciates the logic of this position. But great powers often seek to disrupt the status quo with such capabilities. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has taken a conciliatory, though cautious, approach to Chinese military modernization. His visit to China, heralded as a success by many, broadened the scope of military-to-military cooperation and established a direct hotline between both nations should a crisis arise. Gates' remarks at the Forbidden City further emphasized the need to develop cooperative relations—a view that is consistent with America's strategic objectives in the region. Gates' visit and the consistent efforts of the United States Pacific Command to engage China could be the first step toward getting more than declarations of China's intention to be a good actor. The U.S. will need to convince PLA leaders that transparency, not uncertainty, will be key to avoiding miscalculation in the future, particularly as the seas grow more crowded with more capable naval forces.

Unfortunately, the Chinese decision to deny harbor to the USS Kitty Hawk on Thanksgiving Day 2007, and its refusal to allow shelter to U.S. minesweepers in duress suggest to some that Beijing is beginning to behave provocatively. These incidents, added to the successful direct ascent anti-satellite test in January, mass collection of U.S. Treasury bills and, relentless hacking of Pentagon and other U.S. computer systems, underscore a potentially adventurous Chinese military policy toward America. Individually, these events are perhaps inconsequential, but in sum, they indicate a pattern of change in China's behavior.

Recommendations:

The concurrent challenges of fighting the war on terror and learning how to live with a rising China will require starkly different government efforts and capacities. Either one on its own would be daunting, and taken together, may prove overwhelming. The violent struggle with Islamic jihadists is now an inescapable feature of American foreign policy, while relations with China involve a complex mix of cooperation and competition but are not necessarily destined to degenerate into open hostility. American policymakers must better understand the risks associated with a myopic foreign policy focus and better balance commitments from South America to the Middle East to Asia.

Perhaps it will be prudent for American strategists to consider how best to balance and shape these simultaneous challenges. For instance, Chinese cooperation in the global war on terrorism should be a main feature of American diplomatic strategy with Beijing, given that the PRC has as much to lose from the jihadists' success as the United States. Southeast Asia is likely to be a major battleground for hearts and minds between moderate Muslims and radical Islamic instigators, and China has a major stake in

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seeing the former prevail.

Moreover, policymakers must articulate a realistic and pragmatic China policy. Concerns ranging from consumer safety to worries about significant economic downturn have given trade skeptics in Congress the necessary ammunition to hold up critical free trade agreements and elevated concerns in Beijing. China's secretive military modernization program and assertive provocations, such as its anti-satellite test in 2007, have raised tremendous concern amongst conservative foreign policymakers. America's strategic engagement with China will have to balance between trade skeptics and conservative voices that prefer containment and hedging over collaboration and concord.

Conducting an effective China policy will involve more than just interacting with Beijing. America must commit to engaging in bilateral dialogue and cooperation on trade-related issues while encouraging Beijing to make the necessary adjustments in its export standards, intellectual property rights law -- including revaluation of the Yuan. More importantly, Beijing and Washington need to develop stronger military-to-military contacts. Secretary Gates' forward-looking decision to create a hotline between the two countries has been heralded across the Asia-Pacific for reducing risks associated with miscalculation.

In order for China to be compelled to act as a "responsible stakeholder" it will prove increasingly important for policymakers to devise a strategy that is capable of ensuring the maintenance of American power and influence in the Asia-Pacific for the foreseeable future. It must be embedded within an overall policy toward Asia that uses ties with key allies to act as a force multiplier for U.S. interests throughout the region. Such a strategy should include the following elements:

(1) Reassert American Strategic Presence

Clarity from a new Administration should come immediately, with strong statements that emphasize Asia's permanent importance to the United States. The next President should focus on the global challenges and prospects for cooperation in the Asia-Pacific and communicate a vision of a region that is as integral to U.S. wellbeing as Europe is. A clarifying reference to America's position on Taiwan must complement an articulation of America's desire to expand bilateral ties with mainland China. This is particularly important in the Asia-Pacific where strategic competition may prove more likely in the coming years as both the "Middle Kingdom" and India reemerge as global powers.

(2) Maintain Strong Bilateral Ties

A regional plan is only as strong as the bilateral relations underpinning it. While it is true that bilateral alliances will increasingly prove less capable of dealing with myriad challenges in the region, they will



prove indispensable to managing traditional security challenges. The United States must continue to build strong bilateral relations with Australia, India, Japan, South Korea, Indonesia and Taiwan. In particular, Japan will remain the foundation for America's presence in the Asia-Pacific and our cooperation must deepen beyond the successes of the Bush administration.

(3) Showing up: Get in the Game and Engage More Actively in Regional and Multilateral Forums

The next National Security Council and Secretaries of State and Defense must not only recognize the importance of attending high-level meetings in Asia, but must actively schedule meetings and summits that will further American strategic interests. The State Department must enunciate an interagency attendance policy for meetings in the Asia-Pacific, and ensure that an Assistant Secretary or higher is present at every meeting. To alleviate the potential strains of such a policy, we recommend a reorganization of the authority of the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs. The U.S. must also encourage trilateral talks at the ministerial level; dialogue between the U.S., China, and Japan, or between the U.S., Japan, and ROK could prove particularly productive.

(4) Reexamine Military Engagement

The United States must maintain a forward deployed military presence in the region that is both reassuring to friends and a reminder to China that we remain the ultimate guarantor of regional peace and stability. Military presence is essential for credibly backstopping American alliances and other security commitments in the region. More positively, we should make clear our eagerness to work with all Asian countries, including China, in pursuit of common security objectives such as countering terrorism, piracy, and WMD proliferation. Joint peacekeeping operations involving China, Japan, South Korea, and other countries could also provide opportunities for expanded security dialogue among the participants.

(5) Broadening the Agenda

Focusing on traditional security concerns alone may limit the United States' ability to pursue a broad spectrum of interests in Asia. The primary focus for Asian nations is not security but economics. Meanwhile, the challenges of global climate change and energy competition will become more and more prevalent over time. The complex intersection of all these issues will require cooperative international solutions. In particular, America must continue to pursue the establishment of a bilateral U.S.-China framework for energy conservation and cooperation.



Conclusion:

Much of the American approach to foreign policy in the Cold War era was characterized by a degree of bipartisanship. In Senator Vandenberg's immortal words, bitter divisions often stopped "at the water's edge." Bipartisanship has been conspicuously absent in current debates and this internal divisiveness hampers our effectiveness in the formulation and execution of American foreign policy. Given the magnitude of what lies ahead, a concerted effort to rediscover some common ground in American politics (at least when it comes to foreign policy) may indeed be one of the most important ingredients for a successful foreign policy balancing act.

China's rise to a sustained great power status in the global arena is not preordained, nor is it necessary that the United States and China will find themselves at loggerheads over Taiwan, increasing trade frictions, regional rivalry in Asia, or human rights matters. The United States and China are currently working together surprisingly well on a wide array of issues. However, so long as China's intentions and growing capabilities remain unclear, the United States and other nations in the region will remain wary.

The next president, Democrat or Republican, will face tremendous challenges in the Asia-Pacific that will increasingly involve China. Establishing a foundation and framework for cooperation will prove critical to ensure stability and security in the region.

I once again would like to thank you for the opportunity to testify before this distinguished panel.

Dr. Kurt Campbell was appointed Chief Executive Officer of the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) in January 2007. He concurrently serves as Director of the Aspen Strategy Group and the Chairman of the Editorial Board of the Washington Quarterly, and is the Founder and Principal of StratAsia, a strategic advisory company focused on Asia. Prior to co-founding CNAS, he served as Senior Vice President, Director of the International Security Program, and the Henry A. Kissinger Chair in National Security Policy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Previously, Dr. Campbell served in several capacities in government, including as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asia and the Pacific, Director on the National Security Council Staff, Deputy Special Counselor to the President for NAFTA, and as a White House fellow at the Department of the Treasury. He was also associate professor of public policy and international relations at the John F. Kennedy School of Government and Assistant Director of the Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University. Dr. Campbell has received the Department of Defense Medals for Distinguished Public Service and for Outstanding Public Service. He serves on several boards, including Aegis Capital, the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution, the U.S.-Australian Leadership Dialogue, the Reves Center at the College of William and Mary, STS Technologies, Civitas, the 9-11 Pentagon Memorial Fund, and New Media Strategies. Dr. Campbell is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, the Wasatch Group, and the International Institute for Strategic Studies. Dr. Campbell is coauthor of *Hard Power: The New Politics of National Security*, principal author of *To Prevail: An American Strategy for the Campaign against Terrorism* (CSIS, 2001), coeditor of *The Nuclear Tipping Point* (Brookings, 2004), the author or editor of several other books, and has contributed extensively to journals, magazines, and newspapers. He has also been a contributing writer to *The New York Times*, a frequent on-air contributor to NPR's All Things Considered and a consultant to ABC News. He served as an officer in the U.S. Navy on the Joint Chiefs of Staff and in the Chief of Naval Operations Special Intelligence Unit. He received a B.A. from the University of California, San Diego, a certificate in music and politics from the University of Erevan in the Soviet Union, and a doctorate in international relations from Oxford University as a Marshall scholar.